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The Use of Force to Prevent
Recurrence of Conflict
WHERE ARE THE LIMITS OF SELF-DEFENSE?
Laurie R. Blank†
INTRODUCTION
In January 2018, then U.S. Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson declared that the United States would keep military
forces in Syria even after the end of the conflict with ISIS. As
Tillerson explained, this continued “military presence in Syria”
would be “focused on ensuring ISIS cannot re-emerge.”1 The
backdrop to this decision is the well-accepted determination that
the United States’ decision to pull out of Iraq at the end of 2011
created space for ISIS to emerge as a reconstituted version of alQaeda in Iraq.2 The strategic and policy decision to maintain a
military presence so as to prevent a rebirth or reconstitution of
one of the most brutal terrorist groups of recent decades appears
straightforward. A more complicated question, however, is how to
assess the lawfulness of the use of force in the territory of another
country in order to prevent the reemergence of violence.
International law provides a comprehensive framework
governing the use of force, set forth in the United Nations
Charter. In particular, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits
the “use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”3 This prohibition is the
† Clinical Professor of Law; Director, Center for International and
Comparative Law; Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University
School of Law. I would like to thank Kayla Polonsky (J.D., Emory Law School 2019);
Daniel Miller (J.D., Emory Law School 2019); and Abigail Holt (J.D., Emory Law School
2019) for their outstanding research assistance.
1 Rex W. Tillerson, Sec’y of State, Remarks on the Way Forward for the United
States Regarding Syria at the Hoover Institute at Stanford University (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-the-way-forward-for-the-united-states-regardingsyria/ [https://perma.cc/F7Q2-N7XA].
2 Ryan N. Mannina, How the 2011 US Troop Withdrawal From Iraq Led to the Rise
of ISIS, SMALL WARS J. (Dec. 23, 2018, 4:42 PM), https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how2011-us-troop-withdrawal-iraq-led-rise-isis [https://perma.cc/7SVQ-6NNU].
3 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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foundation of the U.N.’s goal of “sav[ing] succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind.”4 International law provides three
exceptions to this prohibition against the use of force in or against
another state: the consent of the territorial state,5 the
multinational use of force authorized by the Security Council,6 or
individual or collective self-defense.7 Under the first exception,
which is customary in nature, a state engaged in an internal
conflict with a rebel group may seek assistance from other states,8
or a state may consent to another state using force in
counterterrorism operations. The second exception is U.N.
Charter-based: Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to “take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security.”9 For
example, the multinational military operation to protect civilians
in Libya in the spring and summer of 2011 was in accordance with
U.N. Security Council authorization under Article 42.10
This article focuses on the final exception, self-defense, the
most commonly relied-upon justification for the use of force. If the
United States maintains a military presence in Syria after the end
of the conflict with ISIS, neither of the two above exceptions would
apply; there are no suggestions that Syria has consented to the U.S.
military currently being in or remaining in Syria and the U.N.
Security Council has not authorized—and is unlikely to
authorize—a multinational operation in Syria. Indeed, the United
States and its coalition partners have used force against ISIS in
Syria since September 2014 in individual and collective selfdefense.11 More broadly, the United States has relied on selfdefense as the overarching justification for military action against
Id. at pmbl.
Consent is also viewed as not triggering the prohibition on the use of force at all,
such that it is not an exception. See, e.g., INT’L LAW ASS’N, USE OF FORCE COMMITTEE REPORT
18 (2018) [hereinafter ILA 2018 Report]; INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, JUDGE ADVOCATE
GEN. LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 31(5th ed. 2015).
6 U.N. Charter art. 42.
7 U.N. Charter art. 51.
8 See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama
Administration and International Law, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remark
s/139119.htm [https://perma.cc/M9ZM-EHPD] (“[I]n Afghanistan, we work as partners with
a consenting host government.”); Brian K. Landsberg, The United States in Vietnam: A Case
Study in the Law of Intervention, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 515, 523 (1962).
9 U.N. Charter, art. 42.
10 S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
11 See Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the U.N., Letter dated Sept. 20, 2014 from the
Permanent Rep. of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2014/691 (Sept. 22, 2014); Permanent Rep. of the U.S., Letter dated
Sept. 23, 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United States of America to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sept. 23, 2014).
4
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al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups12 over the past seventeen
years, beginning with military operations against al-Qaeda and the
Taliban in October 200113 and stretching across several countries,
including Afghanistan, Pakistan,14 Yemen,15 Somalia,16 and, most
recently, Syria. However, the stated intention for a continued U.S.
military presence is not part and parcel of the existing operations
to defeat and end attacks by ISIS or other terrorist groups.
Although such operations do pose interesting questions regarding
the extent of self-defense against terrorist groups,17 they do not
raise the question of using force—in the form of military forces
present in another state’s territory or any other manner—to
prevent the reemergence or resurgence of violence after conflict.
This article examines how international law applies to
the use of force in the territory of another state for the purpose
of preventing a resurgence of violence after a conflict has ended.
Where the territorial state has consented to such use of force,
including the presence of military forces, the question of
lawfulness under international law does not arise—such as if the
government of Afghanistan were to consent to continued U.S.
military presence or operations after the defeat of the Taliban
12 See Mokhtar Belmokhtar: Top Islamist ‘Killed’ in US Strike, BBC NEWS (June
15, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-33129838 [https://perma.cc/4VUQG67J]; Jim Miklaszewski & Cassandra Vinograd, U.S. Bombs ISIS Sites in Syria and Targets
Khorasan Group, NBC NEWS (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isisterror/u-s-bombs-isis-sites-syria-targets-khorasan-group-n209421 [https://perma.cc/VLA4PK8A]; Bill Roggio, US Airstrikes in Southern Yemen Kill 30 AQAP Fighters: Report, LONG
WAR J. (Sept. 1, 2011), https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/09/us_airstrik
es_in_sou.php [https://perma.cc/SR5L-WKNF]; Phil Stewart, U.S. Strikes al Shabaab
Training Camp in Somalia, More Than 150 Killed, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia-dronestrike/u-s-strikes-al-shabaab-trainingcamp-in-somalia-more-than-150-killed-idUSKCN0W91XW [https://perma.cc/LGA5-22UR].
13 Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 7, 2001 from the
Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the United Nations addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001).
14 Al-Qaeda Number Three ‘Killed by CIA Spy Plane’ in Pakistan, TELEGRAPH
(London) (Dec. 4, 2005), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/1504718/
Al-Qaeda-number-three-killed-by-CIA-spy-plane-in-Pakistan.html [https://perma.cc/L9Z8-EUZ
9]; Eric Schmitt, 2 Qaeda Leaders Killed in U.S. Strike in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/09/world/asia/09pstan.html [https://perma.cc/AR48-7K4H];
Top al-Qaeda Commander ‘Killed’, BBC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.u
k/2/hi/south_asia/7220823.stm [https://perma.cc/QMR7-VWSY].
15 Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, CNN (Nov. 5, 2002), https://www.cnn
.com/2002/WORLD/meast/11/04/yemen.blast/index.html [https://perma.cc/X8MQ-VR8G].
16 Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Kills Top Qaeda Militant in Southern
Somalia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/15/world/africa/15r
aid.html [https://perma.cc/C83S-W92F]; Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Forces Fire
Missiles Into Somalia at a Kenyan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com
/2008/03/04/world/africa/04somalia.html [https://perma.cc/NJN2-LRM7]; US ‘Targets alQaeda’ in Somalia, BBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6245943.stm
[https://perma.cc/TG8S-JBJL].
17 See Laurie R. Blank, The Extent of Self-Defence Against Terrorist Groups:
For How Long and How Far, 47 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 265, 265–66 (2017).
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insurgency. Similarly, U.N. Security Council authorization for
such continued military presence or operations provides
appropriate justification under that recognized exception to the
prohibition on the use of force. In the absence of either of those
justifications, however, can self-defense constitute a justification
for a state to use force to prevent the resurgence of conflict? This
article addresses a series of issues that stem from this broader
question, including whether the meaning of armed attack
remains constant regardless of whether it is assessed in the
absence of (i.e., before) conflict or immediately following the end
of a conflict, and how necessity and proportionality apply to such
uses of force in accordance with the foundational tenets of the
international law of self-defense.
Part I addresses introductory issues, including a brief
explication of the international law of self-defense, the meaning
of the term “use of force” in international law, and the ways in
which different types of conflicts end and how to define or
identify such endings. These introductory issues help to frame
the space in which the central question at hand arises. Part II
analyzes the proper trigger for the right of self-defense, i.e., an
armed attack or imminent armed attack, and explores whether
and how the definition of—and threshold for—an armed attack
might differ in post-conflict scenarios. For example, the nature
of the enemy may produce different perspectives on whether and
when certain acts constitute an armed attack in this phase
between the end of a conflict and a potential reemergence of
violence, as could the location of the acts, the types of acts, or
even the manner in which the conflict ended. Finally, Part III
queries how necessity and proportionality, the key criteria for
the use of force in self-defense, apply or should apply to this
proposed scenario. Understanding the scope and parameters of
necessity and proportionality demands an inquiry into the
legitimate aims of self-defense, as well as a nuanced look at how
these two essential criteria operate and what they are designed
to achieve and safeguard. In order to assess the lawfulness of a
state’s decision to maintain military forces in the territory of
another state after a conflict for the purpose of preventing
resurgence of conflict, it is essential to understand not only the
international law framework, but also how the definitions and
principles in that framework could be applied.
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The international law of self-defense builds on and helps
to establish the basic framework of jus ad bellum, the law
governing the resort to force. A key exception to the prohibition
against the use of force in Article 2(4), self-defense provides that
states may use force as an act of individual or collective selfdefense in response to an armed attack. Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.”18 This provision thus
recognizes the preexisting right of states to use force, including in
response to another state’s request for assistance, in self-defense
against an armed attack.
The prerequisite for any use of force in self-defense is the
existence of an armed attack, a category more severe and
significant than a use of force.19 Although the U.N. Charter does
not define “armed attack,” the jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and customary international law focus on
the “scale and effects”20 of any particular hostile action directed
at a state in order to determine whether it rises to the level of
an armed attack. For example, deploying regular armed forces
across a border, or sending irregular militias, or other armed
groups to accomplish the same purposes, will generally
constitute an armed attack. In contrast, providing assistance,
such as weapons or other support, to rebels or other armed
groups across state borders will not reach the threshold of an
armed attack.21 Although the precise contours of what type of
actor can trigger the right of self-defense remain controversial,
there is a general consensus that any actor—state or non-state—
can launch an armed attack that triggers the victim state’s right
of self-defense. Nothing in Article 51 specifies that the right of
self-defense is only available in response to an armed attack by
another state,22 and state practice in the nearly two decades
U.N. Charter art. 51.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 194–95 (June 27).
20 Id. ¶ 195.
21 Id. ¶ 191.
22 The ICJ has continued to limit the right in this manner. See, e.g., Armed
Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 168,
¶ 146 (Dec. 19) (holding that “there [was] no satisfactory proof of the involvement in these
18
19
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since the 9/11 attacks provides firm support for a right of selfdefense against non-state actors, including U.S. and coalition
operations against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan23 and against ISIS
in Syria, as well as actions by Turkey, Israel, Russia, and other
states.24 In addition, notwithstanding significant disagreement
regarding what specifically constitutes an imminent attack and
when the right of self-defense is triggered in such situations,
there is a general acceptance that a state may act in anticipatory
self-defense to prevent an attack from occurring.25 In the context
of terrorist attacks in particular, prevention of imminent attacks
is a common theme of responses in self-defense, such as the U.S.
strike against the Khorasan Group in Syria in 2014.26
Once an armed attack triggers a state’s right to use force in
self-defense, that use of force must comply with three
attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of the DRC” and therefore no armed attack
triggering the right of self-defense); Legal Consequences of Constr. of Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9) (“Article 51 of the
Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of
armed attack by one State against another State.”); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment,
2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6); Nicar v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 195 (noting that the sending
of armed bands “by or on behalf of a State” could constitute an armed attack). In addition,
some states and commentators also argue that only states can commit an armed attack
triggering the right of self-defense. See, e.g., Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Use of Force Against
Non-State Actors, YOUTUBE, at 24:40 (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=fi66g4Jg0pA [https://perma.cc/YQH5-LTMD] (presenting Patrick Luna, the Second
Secretary to Brazil’s Permanent Mission to the UN); Rio Group, Declaración de la XX
Cumbre de Grupo de Rió [Declaration of the XX Rio Group Summit] (Mar. 7, 2008), in EL
TIEMPO [Colom.] (Mar. 7, 2008), https://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS3991610 [https://perma.cc/C9JR-5FXE].
23 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 1 (Sept. 12, 2001); ILA 2018 Report, supra note 5, at
14–15; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 204–08 (4th ed. 2005);
THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATTACKS 64, 95 (2002); NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NONSTATE ACTORS 31–32 (2010); Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-Emptive
Use of Force: Afghanistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 17 (2003); Brendan
Pearson, PM Commits to Mutual Defence, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., Sept. 15, 2001, at 9; Org. of
Am. States [OAS], Support for the Measures of Individual and Collective Self-Defense, OAS
Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.24 – CS/TIAR/Res.1/01 (Oct. 16, 2001), http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/
follow_e.htm [https://perma.cc/67CV-KP8J]; Org. of Am. States [OAS], Terrorist Threat to the
Americas, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.24 – RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sept. 21, 2001), http://www.
oas.org/OASpage/crisis/RC.24e.htm [https://perma.cc/4YSL-VGMC]; North Atlantic Treaty,
art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243; Press Release, N. Atl. Treaty Org. [NATO],
Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), https://www.nato.int/docu/
pr/2001/p01-124e.htm [https://perma.cc/SH74-QAFC]. In addition, the states using force
against ISIS have all asserted self-defense (whether individual or collective) as the
justification, providing additional contemporary state practice supporting the right of selfdefense against non-state actors.
24 See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 486–87 (2012).
25 See LUBELL, supra note 23, at 54–56; CHRISTIAN HENDERSON, THE USE OF
FORCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 277 (2018).
26 Rebecca Kaplan, Khorasan Was “Nearing the Execution Phase” of an Attack:
Pentagon, CBS NEWS (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/khorasan-wasnearing-the-execution-phase-of-an-attack-pentagon/ [https://perma.cc/6NPC-HEUV].
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requirements, derived in part from the Caroline incident in the
nineteenth century: necessity, proportionality, and immediacy. In
response to the 1837 British attack on the Caroline, a steamer
running arms and materiel to insurgents on the Canadian side of
the Niagara River, U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster declared
that the use of force in self-defense should be limited to “cases in
which the ‘necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming,
and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’’”27
Furthermore, the force used must not be “unreasonable or
excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence,
must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.”28
As a result, as the ICJ and other courts have reaffirmed
repeatedly, the central features of the right of self-defense are
that the force used is necessary and proportionate to the goal of
repelling the attack or ending the grievance.29 The third criterion,
immediacy, addresses when the right to self-defense matures in
the case of an imminent attack, and how soon after an attack the
victim state must act.30 Overall, the requirements of necessity and
proportionality in particular focus on whether the defensive act is
appropriate in relation to the ends sought. Necessity demands
that there be no non-forceful means reasonably available to repel
or halt the attack and proportionality requires that the amount
or degree of force used be proportionate to the objective of ending
or repelling the attack.
B.

What Constitutes a Use or Threat of Force?

Beyond the parameters set forth above for a state to
respond lawfully in self-defense to an armed attack or an
imminent armed attack, one important foundational question
remains—when is a state’s action a “use of force” such that the
prohibition in Article 2(4) and the accompanying exceptions or
justifications apply to the lawfulness inquiry? If maintaining
27 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Lord Ashburton, Special
British Minister (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 455 (Hunter Miller ed., 1934).
28 Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Lord Ashburton, Special
British Minister (July 27, 1842), reprinted in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 449 (Hunter Miller ed., 1934).
29 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶¶ 43, 73–74, 76
(Nov. 6); Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 237 (June 27); Jus ad Bellum, Ethiopia’s Claims 1–
8 (Eri. v. Eth.), Partial Award 1, ¶ 11 (Eri. Eth. Claims Commission (Dec. 19, 2005))
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/763 [https://perma.cc/29HM-MUJL].
30 Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus
ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE FAULT LINES
49, 63–66 (Michael N. Schmitt, ed., 2012).
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military forces after the end of conflict does not—or could be
argued not to—constitute a use of force, then the jus ad bellum
and self-defense analysis does not apply. Understanding how
international law applies and how a state might present
arguments in this regard is therefore essential to any effective
interpretation or response to such claims.
For many actions a state may take to prevent resurgence
of conflict, such as kinetic operations to disable or destroy an
adversary’s fighters or military equipment, this would be a
relatively simple question with respect to the threshold for the
use of force. Such acts would, of course, raise questions on the
other end of the spectrum regarding whether such acts constitute
an armed attack against the state in which they take place. For
example, an attack using military or other armed force inside the
territory of another state or against that state’s forces is an armed
attack and is therefore a use of force, as is an “‘invasion’ by the
armed forces of a state into the territory of another state.”31 A
state that has military forces in another state by permission but
extends their stay beyond the permission or uses them “in
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement,”32
also violates the prohibition against the use of force and likely
commits an armed attack.33
At a lower level of activity, however, a brief analysis of
what constitutes a use of force is useful to specify the category of
actions that fit within the instant analysis. If, in an effort to
prevent the resurgence of conflict, a state takes certain steps
that do not rise to the level of a use of force, then the self-defense
analysis in this article is not relevant because the actions in
question would not violate the prohibition in Article 2(4) and
would not require an exception or justification.34
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter does not define “force”
or “use of force” or provide any examples to guide our overall
understanding of the term. As a starting point, it is generally
accepted that “force” means “armed force” as used elsewhere in
the Charter, thus excluding economic pressure or psychological
or political coercion.35 The jurisprudence of the ICJ identifies a
category of “measures which do not constitute an armed attack
See HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 57.
G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at annex art. 3(e) (Dec. 14, 1974).
33 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 189 (calling such activity “a constructive
armed attack”).
34 Other international law frameworks and prohibitions remain relevant, such
as the prohibition on intervention, the principle of non-interference, countermeasures,
and sovereignty, but are outside the scope of this article.
35 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 86.
31
32
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but may nevertheless involve a use of force,”36 and
differentiates the gravest types of the use of force from “other
less grave forms.”37 A use of force therefore does not necessarily
involve the same degree, amount, or severity of force as an
armed attack and a state might thus breach Article 2(4)’s
prohibition on the use of force without triggering the right of
self-defense of the victim state.38
Current ICJ jurisprudence does not offer any substantial
guidance for identifying the lower threshold of a use of force as
prohibited in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. Many argue that
there is no gravity or severity threshold for identifying a use of
force, relying on the ICJ’s distinction between armed attack and
other uses of force to suggest that “forcible acts need not be
especially grave to qualify as the use of force.”39 Thus, “[e]ven
temporary and limited incursions described as ‘in-and-out
operations’ are said to be an infringement of the principle contained
in Article 2(4).”40 However, state practice and extensive debate
among commentators suggests that there may be de minimus uses
of force that do not violate the prohibition.41 For example, the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in
Georgia explained that “[t]he prohibition of the use of force covers
all physical force which surpasses a minimum threshold of
intensity,” such that “[o]nly very small incidents lie below this
threshold, for instance[,] the targeted killing of single individuals,
forcible abductions of individual persons, or the interception of a
single aircraft.”42 Other examples of state practice that have been
characterized as “insufficiently grave” could “include operations
36 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 210 (June 27).
37 Id. ¶191; Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 51 (Nov. 6).
38 See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 193 (“[I]t is clear that one State may
employ some illegal force against another without unleashing a full-fledged armed
attack.”). The United States generally asserts that there is no difference between a use of
force and an armed attack and that it can respond in self-defense to any use of force by
another state. Ryan Goodman, Cyber Operations and the U.S. Definition of “Armed Attack,”
JUSTSECURITY (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/53495/cyber-operations-u-sdefinition-armed-attack/ [https://perma.cc/7NG7-KW2B].
39 Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum:
Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AM. J. INT’L L.
159, 165 (2014).
40 See LUBELL, supra note 23, at 28.
41 See, e.g., OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR: THE PROHIBITION ON THE
USE OF FORCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (2010); Mary Ellen O’Connell,
The Prohibition on the Use of Force, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND JUS POST BELLUM 89,
102 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson eds., 2013).
42 Report of the Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Geor., Vol.
II, at 242 n.49 (Sept. 2009), https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf4/IIFFMCG_Volume_II1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/67EM-FXXE] [hereinafter Report on the Conflict in Geor.].
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aimed at rescuing nationals abroad, ‘hot pursuit’ operations, smallscale counterterrorist operations abroad, and localized hostile
encounters between military units.”43
A state retaining military forces in another state after the
end of a conflict in which it acted in self-defense—either against
that state or against a non-state armed group located in the
territory of that state—may present a more difficult question,
however. Although the presence of military forces in the territory
of another state without that state’s permission or consent is
generally understood as a use of force, that understanding applies
primarily to a state’s unilateral or first use of its military in such
manner, such as Russia’s invasion of Crimea in March 2014,44 not
to a post-self-defense situation, which is not a common occurrence.
In essence, the key question for the instant discussion is whether
the fact that a state engaged in military operations in another
state’s territory as part of legitimate self-defense operations
changes how we understand continued military presence, or other
low-level acts, after that self-defense operation has ended. If such
continued presence is interpreted in the same manner as other
situations when one state thrusts its military onto the territory of
another state—either through invasion or presence beyond
permission or consent—then such continued presence to prevent
recurrence of conflict would indeed constitute a use of force.
Alternatively, the fact that the original presence and
military operations in that other state’s territory were justified by
self-defense could be a significant factor in determining whether
the continued presence for the sake of preventing a recurrence of
that conflict is a use of force or falls below that threshold. If so,
the next step would be to consider whether anything beyond the
mere continued presence would then cross that threshold—
moving from patrols or other demonstrations of force as an initial
level, to targeted operations to detain or otherwise disable
individuals posing a threat, to more extensive operations against
pockets of violence or resistance. Existing jurisprudence and
scholarly commentary, as discussed above, suggests that any such
activity would meet the threshold of a use of force. Furthermore,
although the post-self-defense nature of these acts may have
significant consequences for the application of necessity and
proportionality in understanding the parameters of lawfulness, it
should not change the fundamental qualification of such acts and
operations as uses of force, if they would be uses of force in
ordinary circumstances.
43
44

See Ruys, supra note 39, at 159.
See HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 57–58.
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Even if one were to argue that a decision to maintain
military forces in the territory of another state to prevent
recurrence of violence by a non-state group in that territory is not
a use of force, it could, alternatively, constitute a threat of force,
which is also prohibited by Article 2(4).45 A threat of force occurs
when a state communicates its intention to use force, often through
“an express or implied promise by a government of a resort to force
conditional on non-acceptance of certain demands of that
government.”46 Threats of force are generally understood to involve
a communicative element, such as North Korea’s threats to target
the U.S. territory of Guam in 2017,47 but nonverbal means can, in
specific circumstances, also be considered a threat. Although
military exercises or weapons tests ordinarily are not sufficient to
constitute a threat of force,48 on certain occasions an extensive
buildup of forces along a border has been condemned as a threat of
force.49 With respect to acts taken to prevent recurrence of conflict,
a state might issue warnings or ultimatums regarding forceful
consequences if an adversary state or group were to reengage in
violence, which would be threats of force. Although there are no
stated exceptions to the prohibition on threats of force—in either
treaty or customary law—threats of force are not prohibited if the
force threatened would be lawful, such as in self-defense or
pursuant to U.N. Security Council authorization. The ICJ thus
explained in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion:
Whether a signalled intention to use force if certain events occur is or
is not a “threat” . . . depends on various factors. If the envisaged use
of force is itself unlawful, the stated readiness to use it would be a
threat prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4 . . . . In short, if it is to
be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be a use
of force that is in conformity with the Charter.50

As a result, the analysis throughout this article regarding the
application of necessity and proportionality to the use of force to
prevent resurgence of conflict applies equally if such actions are
considered to be threats of force rather than uses of force. If the

U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 364 (1963).
47 See Jesse Johnson, North Korea Renews Threat to Target Guam Ahead of Joint
U.S.-South Korea Military Exercises, JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www
.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/10/14/asia-pacific/north-korea-renews-threat-target-guam-aheadjoint-u-s-south-korea-military-exercises/#.Xm7WQm57nxU [https://perma.cc/8EBA-P4MU].
48 See Report on the Conflict in Geor., supra note 42, at 232.
49 James A. Green & Francis Grimal, The Threat of Force as an Action in SelfDefense Under International Law, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 285, 296–97 (2011).
50 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 47 (July 8).
45
46
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acts would be lawful self-defense as uses of force, then threats to
that effect would also be lawful.
C.

Types of Armed Conflicts and How They End

One final important introductory question is whether the
use of force at or after the end of conflict is part and parcel of that
original operation or is a new use of force triggering the jus ad
bellum analysis anew. A brief explication of how different types of
armed conflicts end is therefore useful to examine whether and
how the ending of a conflict affects the legal analysis regarding
the use of force to prevent the recurrence of conflict after that
ending. More broadly, questions of when and how the conflict
ends have existential consequences for this overall inquiry. If, in
fact, the conflict has not yet ended, or a good argument to that
effect has been made, then the question of using force in selfdefense to prevent recurrence of conflict and how necessity and
proportionality guide or cabin that use of force would not arise,
because the fact that the conflict is still ongoing means that
recurrence of conflict would not be a relevant inquiry. The
question of when the conflict ends, therefore, determines whether
a state is using force to prevent recurrence of conflict—the topic
of this article—or to finish prosecuting the conflict and bring it to
an end. Although the end of conflict is normally a law of armed
conflict (LOAC) question, seeking to determine when the law
ceases to apply, here it also serves as an important marker for
this jus ad bellum inquiry.
Both international armed conflicts and non-international
armed conflicts can present challenges regarding how the end—or
potential end—of the conflict affects the application of jus ad
bellum to any force used to prevent conflict from reemerging. The
Geneva Conventions reference the end of international armed
conflict with phrases such as “cessation of active hostilities”51 and
“general close of military operations.”52 At the time the conventions
were drafted, the “general close of military operations” was

51 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (referring to the release and repatriation
of prisoners of war).
52 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 6, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (the application of the Fourth
Geneva Convention in the territory of parties to the conflict ends upon the general close
of military operations); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) art. 3(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
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considered to be “when the last shot has been fired.”53 This notion
of the general close of military operations serves as an objective
criterion to determine when the facts on the ground demonstrate
that the conflict is over. Noting the risk of a revolving door of
applicability and nonapplicability of LOAC if termination were
identified too easily, the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) considered “whether at any
point . . . the international armed conflict had found a sufficiently
general, definitive and effective termination so as to end the
applicability of the law of armed conflict . . . . in particular whether
there was a general close of military operations.”54 Nonetheless,
doing so can be significantly more complicated than the treaty law
appears to foresee.
The classic means of ending international armed conflict
is a peace treaty, which “(i) puts an end to a pre-existing state of
war and (ii) introduces or restores amicable relations between the
parties.”55 Other means for ending conflict include mutual
consent, armistice, capitulation, surrender, or unilateral
declaration.56 Although traditionally armistice was considered to
be only suspending hostilities rather than terminating the
conflict, it is now common for an armistice to be a means of ending
conflict. For example, the 1953 Panmunjom Agreement
establishing an armistice in Korea declared its objective of
ensuring “a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of
armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is
achieved,”57 thus ending the conflict. In this way, an armistice can
“put[ ] an end to the war, and does not merely suspend the
combat.”58 The nature of contemporary conflict has added another
layer of complexity, with international armed conflicts “rarely
end[ing] with the conclusion of a peace treaty but [rather] are
often characterized by unstable ceasefires, a slow and progressive

53 Report of Comm. III to the Plenary Assembly of the Diplomatic Conference of
Geneva, in FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, Vol. II–
A, 812, 815 (1949).
54 Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶ 1694 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2011), https://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tjug/en/110
415_judgement_vol2.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7AL-XQSV].
55 Yoram Dinstein, The Initiation, Suspension, and Termination of War, 75
INT’L. L. STUD. 131, 135 (2000).
56 See JOINT DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS CTR. (JDCC), U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF.,
THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 10.13–10.32 (2004);
DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 42–50.
57 Agreement Between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the
One Hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander
of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in
Korea, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 186, 187 (1953).
58 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 42.
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decrease in intensity, or the intervention of peacekeepers.”59
Interestingly, and of particular relevance here, several
descriptions of the end of international armed conflict include the
possible resumption of hostilities as an important consideration
for identifying a stable end to conflict. Thus, the 2016
Commentary to the First Geneva Convention emphasizes that the
“general close of military operations” did not only mean the end
of active hostilities, “but also the end of military movements of a
bellicose nature, including those that reform, reorganize, or
reconstitute, so that the likelihood of the resumption of hostilities
can reasonably be discarded.”60 This framework leaves space for
states to argue that any use of force is part of the conflict because
such actions aim to prevent a resumption of hostilities.
Non-international armed conflict poses additional
challenges, both because of the nature of the parties and the lack
of treaty law provisions. Common Article 3 to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 offers no guidance regarding the end of noninternational armed conflict61 and although Additional Protocol II
references the end of conflict with respect to protections for
persons detained due to the conflict,62 it does not provide any rules
or other guidance for identifying the end of conflict. In the same
manner, the ICTY offered a general statement in the Tadić case
that “[i]nternational humanitarian law applies from the initiation
of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of
hostilities until . . . in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful
settlement is achieved.”63 What constitutes a peaceful settlement,
however, is unclear. For the purposes of this article, the end of
purely internal conflicts between a state and a non-state group
within its own territory is not relevant, because any steps taken
to prevent resurgence of such conflict would not trigger the jus ad
bellum as long as they do not involve the state using force in the
59 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA
CONVENTION ¶ 276 (2d ed. 2016), https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?
action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518
[https://perma.cc/DK5T-ARH6] [hereinafter 2016 COMMENTARY].
60 Id. ¶ 278; see also Marko Milanovic, The End of Application of International
Humanitarian Law, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 163, 174 (2014); Derek Jinks, The Temporal Scope
of Application of International Humanitarian Law in Contemporary Conflicts 3 (Harvard
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Background Paper, 2003),
https://securitypolicylaw.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Jinks-Derek.Temporal-Scope-ofIHL-in-Contemporary-Conflicts.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q99B-9M9L].
61 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, supra note 52, art. 3.
62 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
arts. 2, 6, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
63 Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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territory of another state. This brief discussion will focus instead
on non-international armed conflicts in which the state is using
force outside its territory, such as spillover conflicts, cross-border
conflicts, or conflicts between a state and transnational terrorist
group or armed group that take place in or across multiple
states.64 In recent years, the seemingly endless conflict between
the United States and al-Qaeda and associated groups has
focused attention on the challenge of identifying the end of noninternational armed conflict, with multiple resulting theories or
possible mechanisms for the end of such conflicts.
The 2016 Commentary to the First Geneva Convention
suggests useful factual indicators of a peaceful settlement or end to
the conflict, including “the mere fact that one of the Parties ceases
to exist,” or a “lasting cessation of armed confrontations without
real risk of resumption” regardless of the existence of a ceasefire,
armistice, peace agreement, or unilateral pronouncement.65 One
obvious approach would be that the end of non-international armed
conflict occurs when the state has defeated the non-state armed
group, such as in Sri Lanka, but identifying what “defeat” means
in a conflict with a terrorist or insurgent group can be
extraordinarily challenging.66 In 2012, then-U.S. Department of
Defense General Counsel Jeh Johnson proposed the idea of
a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of al
Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured, and the group is
no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the
United States, such that al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that
our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been
effectively destroyed.67

Another option is to “reverse engineer” the Tadić test of intensity
and organization for identifying the start of non-international
armed conflict, such that when either the intensity of the
violence or the level of organization of the non-state group drops

See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 9–11, (Oct. 2011),
https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/15061/32ic-report-on-ihl-and-challenges-ofarmed-conflicts.pdf [https://perma.cc/49H6-JA77].
65 See 2016 COMMENTARY, supra note 59, ¶¶ 489–91; see also Rogier Bartels, The End
of Non-International Armed Conflicts and the Application of IHL, ARMED GROUPS & INT’L L.
(Feb. 19, 2014), https://armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2014/02/19/the-end-of-non-internat
ional-armed-conflicts-and-the-application-of-ihl/ [https://perma.cc/AC5T-S8VN] (noting that
fighting has continued in South Sudan notwithstanding various ceasefire agreements).
66 For an extensive analysis of this question, see Blank, supra note 17.
67 Jeh Charles Johnson, General Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Remarks at the
Oxford Union, Oxford University: The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates: How
Will it End? (Nov. 30, 2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/211
954.pdf [https://perma.cc/46BA-LS2F].
64
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below the threshold of “protracted armed violence” set forth in
Tadić, the conflict has ended.68
The types of non-state groups fighting in noninternational armed conflicts add an additional layer of
complexity to this already complicated analysis. The nature of
terrorist groups in particular—which morph, splinter, and
reconfigure—make conclusions regarding defeat extraordinarily
difficult. Furthermore, the diffuse geographical nature of most
conflicts with terrorist groups and the decentralized nature of
such groups generally make traditional temporal concepts
unlikely to apply effectively. No less, terrorist groups or other
insurgent groups may launch attacks or take other action not
because they are in a position of strength, but precisely because
they are at a moment of existential danger. Such groups may
“have an innate compulsion to act—for example, [they] may be
driven to engage in terrorist attacks to maintain support, to
shore up [their] organizational integrity, or even to foster [their]
continued existence.”69 Signs suggesting that an enemy group is
getting stronger could actually be signals that it is significantly
weakened; in the same way, a lack of attacks or overt action does
not mean that a terrorist group is in decline. On some level,
therefore, when a state appears to be using force to prevent the
recurrence of conflict, it may actually still be working to defeat
the group in question. No less, the state and external actors or
interlocutors will likely have differing conceptions of the purpose
of that force, rendering it extraordinarily difficult to discern
whether it is a “new” use of force that triggers the jus ad bellum
or is part of defeating the group as part of the original conflict.
II.

TRIGGERING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE TO PREVENT
RECURRENCE OF CONFLICT

A state seeking to maintain military forces in the
territory of another state after the end of a conflict to prevent
resurgence of violence must, as discussed above, rely on selfdefense to justify that use of force. It is axiomatic that the right
See Milanovic, supra note 60, at 180; see also Rogier Bartels, From Jus In Bello to
Jus Post Bellum: When Do Non-International Armed Conflicts End?, in JUS-POST-BELLUM:
MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 297, 314 (Stahn et al. eds., 2014) (proposing a
framework for identifying when fighting has dropped below the Tadić threshold so as to end a
non-international armed conflict); Dustin A. Lewis et al., Indefinite War: Unsettled International
Law on the End of Armed Conflict 97 (Harv. L. Sch. Program on Int’l L. & Armed Conflict, Feb.
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2923413 [https://perma.cc/59GU8YNJ] (using the notion of a “two-way ratchet theory” for this reverse Tadić approach).
69 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of
Terrorist Groups, 31 INT’L. SECURITY 7, 11 (2006).
68
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to use force in self-defense depends on the existence of an armed
attack or an imminent armed attack. The use of force to prevent
recurrence of conflict presents two possible variations on that
theme, however. First, particularly in situations where a conflict
has recently ended, a state may consider any use of force to
prevent the resurgence of violence as part of the self-defense
authority that allowed the original use of force to respond to the
armed attack at the start of the conflict. The question of when
and how a conflict ends can thus be critical to this analysis by
either differentiating a new situation of violence, demonstrating
the continued existence of an ongoing conflict, or perhaps
leaving a grey area in which identifying the end of a conflict and
the space for a new conflict to potentially begin is difficult.
Second, and more consequential, a state might assert that the
threshold for an armed attack is or should be different in
situations where a state seeks to prevent the recurrence of a
conflict that recently ended. If the post-conflict environment
alters or could alter the conception of the threshold for an armed
attack, based on the nature of the group, the location, the nature
of the act, or any other factors, the potential for a significant
evolution in the law arises, with all of the concomitant risks and
concerns such a development could bring.
A.

Is a New Armed Attack Necessary?

Questioning whether an armed attack is necessary for
the use of force in self-defense seems heretical given the
foundational nature of the prohibition on the use of force and
the established architecture for the self-defense exception to
that prohibition. However, the nature of many contemporary
conflicts, whether in Syria or other areas, in which an agreed
end to the conflict is elusive and one or more non-state armed
groups maintains the ideological fervor and some capacity to
continue to inflict violence and harm on the local population or
the state’s military and security forces, requires an
examination of this particular question. Pragmatically, states
will always see threat and the need to respond to that threat as
the primary considerations driving the strategic, operational
and tactical calculus at the start of, throughout, and at the end
of armed conflict.70 At the same time, the architecture of the
70 See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Geography of Armed Conflict: Why it is a Mistake
to Fish for the Red Herring, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 77, 82 (2013) (“Armed conflict is a threatdriven concept, arising when the threat necessitates resort to combat power, and
extending to wherever the operational and tactical opportunity to produce a militarily
valuable effect on the enemy arises.”).
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international system rests on a balance between, on one side,
the prohibition of the use of force and the obligation to seek
peaceful resolution of disputes and, on the other, the
recognition and preservation of state sovereignty and the right
and duty to protect territory, population, and interests from
harm. This combination and balancing of imperatives demands
clarity and predictability in the rules, both for the state taking
or considering action and for external actors—whether they be
other states, regional or international organizations, advocacy
groups, or the court of public opinion—assessing the lawfulness
of state action.
As a starting point, the prohibition of the use of force
demands that the armed attack requirement remain the
essential threshold for any inquiry into the use of force in selfdefense, notwithstanding the fact that the very same parties
have fought one or more armed conflicts in the near or distant
past. Any other presumption drastically undermines the U.N.
Charter framework and the goal of preventing war, by easing
the resort to force in a wider range of situations.71 Nonetheless,
it is useful to explore how or when this foundational rule might
give way, at least along the edges, to a different interpretation
and—equally important—whether it should, in order to prepare
for and understand the content and consequences of possible
justifications for the use of force to prevent resurgence of conflict.
First, one possible argument is that the use of force to
prevent resurgence of conflict, whether against another state or
against a non-state group outside one’s territory, does not fall
within the realm of self-defense at all, but rather is a type of
residual armed conflict authority. LOAC includes several rights,
authorities and obligations that continue after the end of armed
conflict. For example, a number of LOAC’s protective rules
continue to apply after the end of hostilities in order to ensure
humane treatment and protection of persons still at risk as a result
of the conflict.72 Persons who have fallen into the hands of the
enemy, whether protected persons, prisoners of war, or other
individuals, continue to benefit from the relevant LOAC

71 See, e.g., Georg Nolte & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 2 THE CHARTER
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1397, ¶ 10, at 1403 (Bruno Simma et al. eds.,
3d ed. 2012) (“The prevailing view considers Art. 51 to exclude any self-defence, other
than that in response to an armed attack, referring, above all, to the purpose of the UN
Charter, i.e., to restrict as far as possible the use of force by individual States.”).
72 CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949 ¶¶ 157–60, at 68–69 (Yvez Sandoz et al. eds., Tony Langham et al. trans., 1987).
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protections “until their final release and repatriation,”73 even if
such release or repatriation takes place after the end of the conflict
or after the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocols cease to
apply.74 With respect to a state’s authority to take coercive
measures, the Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Conventions
recognizes that internment and restrictive measures allowed
during conflict may, in some circumstances, continue for some time
after the end of hostilities because “[t]he disorganization caused by
war may quite possibly involve some delay before the return to
normal,”75 and such measures are “removed by stages as the law of
the country is gradually adjusted to peacetime conditions.”76
However, an attempt to translate these continuing
protective obligations or reasonable delays on end of conflict
obligations into a residual authority to use force, including deadly
combat force, is a significant—and problematic—stretch. Although
the principle of military necessity provides for the use of force to
achieve the complete submission of the enemy as quickly as
possible, the principle and its accompanying authorities apply
when LOAC is applicable, that is, during armed conflict. The
exigency of war justifies the extraordinary nature of LOAC
authorities—but once the armed conflict has ended and the
exigency no longer exists, extending the permissive use of force
authorities of LOAC is a dangerous proposition that opens the door
to a significant blurring of legal paradigms with problematic
consequences for the protection of persons and the clarity of legal
authorities.
Beyond a possible residual armed conflict authority, the
nature of the conflict and the manner in which it ended may be
significant for examining whether and when a firm requirement
for an armed attack as the precursor for self-defense might give
way. First, consider most international armed conflicts, which
usually end with some form of agreement, whether armistice,
73 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 51, art. 5; see also Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 (“until their final repatriation”).
74 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, supra note 52 (“Protected persons whose release, repatriation or reestablishment may take place after [the general close of military operations or the end
of occupation] shall meanwhile continue to benefit by the present Convention.”); Protocol
I, supra note 52 (“[P]ersons whose final release, repatriation or re-establishment takes
place [after the general close of military operations or the termination of occupation]
shall continue to benefit from the relevant provisions of the Conventions and of this
Protocol until their final release, repatriation or re-establishment.”).
75 OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
GENEVA CONVENTION (IV) RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME
OF WAR 515 (Jean S. Pictet ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., 1958).
76 Id. at 270.
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treaty, or another variation.77 Although the disputes and causes
of one or more past conflicts may remain even after the most
recent conflict has ended, any of the formal ends to conflict
described above affirmatively separate the instances of conflict
and violence for the purposes of analyzing the resort to force. As
a result, even though a “factual nexus link[s] the two periods of
hostilities, the interjection of a treaty of peace signifies that
legally they must be viewed as separate wars.”78 The fact that
two states legally remain in a state of war after the imposition
of an armistice ending hostilities does not change this result.
Thus, for example, notwithstanding the fact that the United
States and North Korea have remained in a state of war since
the end of the conflict in 1953, any discussions regarding
possible U.S. use of force against North Korea in the past year
rested firmly on the traditional inquiries of armed attack,
imminent armed attack, and self-defense, examining whether
North Korean behavior constituted an armed attack or
imminent armed attack such that the United States would have
the right to use force in self-defense.79 Similarly, situations of
sequential hostilities or conflicts between two states, such as
between India and Pakistan, are commonly treated as separate
armed conflicts with fresh justifications for the use of force.80
Non-international armed conflicts may well present a
different array of possibilities here, however. Although a state will
assert its own domestic authority to ensure public order and
security after the end of a non-international armed conflict on its
own territory—and resurgence of violence within its territory
would not present jus ad bellum questions regardless—a state
emerging from an extraterritorial or cross-border noninternational armed conflict does not have that same opportunity
to impose law enforcement measures to stifle any disturbances or
pockets of possible resistance. Where such conflicts do conclude
with a defined end, and in particular when the state on whose
territory the non-state group operates is capable of suppressing
future acts or resurgence of violence against the state that was
77 See, e.g., Joakim Kreutz, How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the
UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset, 47 J. PEACE RES. 243, 244–45 (2010).
78 See Dinstein, supra note 55, at 137.
79 See, e.g., Michael Schmitt & Ryan Goodman, Best Advice for Policymakers
on “Bloody Nose” Strike Against North Korea: It’s Illegal, JUSTSECURITY (Jan. 23, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/51320/advice-policymakers-bloody-nose-strike-northkorea-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/568V-FV4H].
80 See, e.g., Ellen Barry & Salman Masood, India Claims ‘Surgical Strikes’ Across
Line of Control in Kashmir, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/
30/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan.html [https://perma.cc/AY43-5WQW] (describing Indian
strikes in Kashmir as responding to terrorist attacks and noting that Pakistan asserted its right
to respond in self-defense).
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engaged in the conflict, the analysis will be similar to that above
regarding international armed conflicts; once the conflict ends, any
new violence and possible use of force by the state gives rise to the
ordinary jus ad bellum analysis of armed attack and self-defense
anew. Most conflicts of this type do not have a well-defined end,
however, as discussed above, leaving open the possibility for a state
to assert that it can use force without pointing to an armed attack
that would justify the use of force in self-defense.
One argument a state might proffer is that repeated
instances of conflict are part of one overarching and ongoing
conflict that ebbs and flows with periodic “hot” engagements and
less intense engagements in between. For example, Israel takes
this approach with regard to the conflict with Hamas, such that
“Israel’s military actions during the 2014 Gaza Conflict were
part of an ongoing armed conflict involving attacks against
Israel by Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza
Strip for over 14 years” and the “2014 Gaza Conflict was simply
the latest in a series of armed confrontations, precipitated by the
continuing attacks perpetrated by Hamas and other terrorist
organisations against Israel.”81 Under this theory, the use of
force to prevent resurgence of conflict is designed to prevent
flare-ups of active hostilities during a long-running conflict, in
essence preventing a simmering conflict from boiling over, and
therefore is not a self-defense engagement at all.
Second, a state might assert that an armed attack would
not be necessary if the state’s original self-defense authority
extended to include preventing violence or attacks after the
conflict ends. Preventing future attacks is a frequent aim of selfdefense, particularly in the context of states facing threats from
terrorist groups or other non-state entities outside their borders.
Indeed, the very nature of terrorist attacks as singular attacks
on civilian sites or events—where the attackers are far away or
die as planned in the attack and the leaders are far from the
point of attack at all times—mean that the classic notion of
repelling an attack as the justification for self-defense falls
short. States responding to completed attacks thus commonly
point to the need to defend against future attacks and future
threats, even if undefined, in justifying action in self-defense.82
81 STATE OF ISRAEL, THE 2014 GAZA CONFLICT: FACTUAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 28-29
(2015); see also Pnina Sharvit Baruch, Operation Protective Edge: Legality and Legitimacy, INST.
FOR NAT’L SEC. STUDIES (July 22, 2014), http://www.inss.org.il/publication/operation-protectiveedge-legality-and-legitimacy/ [https://perma.cc/Q6PV-55S6].
82 President Clinton’s statement announcing U.S. strikes in response to the
1998 Embassy bombings illustrates this point, declaring that “[w]ith compelling evidence
that the bin Ladin network of terrorist groups was planning to mount further attacks
against Americans and other freedom-loving people, I decided America must act.”
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In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, there is a growing
recognition that, rather than looking at each terrorist attack or
potential attack as an armed attack in isolation and examining
the necessity, proportionality, and immediacy criteria for each
such attack separately, terrorist groups now should be “viewed
as conducting campaigns” and once “an ongoing campaign is
underway, acts of self-defense are acceptable throughout its
course.”83 Under this approach, the self-defense authority
triggered by the original armed attack thus extends to acts taken
to prevent future attacks until the danger of such attacks is over.
The key question for the instant analysis, however, is whether
this same extended understanding of the original self-defense
authority applies when the hostilities or engagements between
the state and the non-state armed group constitute a noninternational armed conflict, rather than a series of acts in selfdefense. That is, the question is whether the armed conflict
between the state and the non-state group swallows or severs
the self-defense authority such that violence or attacks after the
armed conflict would not be part of a terrorist group’s “ongoing
campaign” for purposes of the state’s self-defense authority. To
the extent there is a recognized end to the conflict, particularly
by the state, any new use of force by the state should not fall
within the original self-defense authority.
Finally, a state would not need to rely on an armed attack
as the trigger for the use of force in self-defense if preventing
recurrence of conflict fits within the conception of defeating the
non-state armed group. Just as a state attacked by another state
may seek to defeat the attacking state as the means of repelling or
halting the attack in certain circumstances, so a state may seek to
defeat or destroy a non-state armed group in self-defense.84
However, it is unclear what defeat of a terrorist group or other
types of insurgent groups looks like. Even a cursory familiarity
President William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action against Terrorist
Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 34 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS
1643, 1643 (Aug. 20, 1998), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1998-08-24/pdf
/WCPD-1998-08-24-Pg1642.pdf [https://perma.cc/25DS-2836].
83 Michael N. Schmitt, MARSHALL CTR. PAPERS NO. 5, COUNTER-TERRORISM
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 66 (2002), https://www.marshallcenter.or
g/mcpublicweb/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/mcPapers/mc-paper_5-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5D2N-3F7M].
84 For example, the United States seeks to “ensure a lasting defeat of al Qaeda and
violent extremist affiliates.” See Johnson, supra note 67. Similarly, it seeks to “to degrade and
ultimately destroy ISIS.” President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on United States
Strategy to Combat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Terrorist Organization (Sept.
10, 2014), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201400654/pdf/DCPD-201400654.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HW4T-HWBB]; see also 602 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2015) col. 1489 (remarks
by Prime Minister David Cameron at House of Commons); Blank, supra note 17, at 285–89.
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with al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups demonstrates that
conventional physical manifestations of defeat simply do not exist
or even make sense in the transnational terrorism environment.
Different conceptions of defeat lead to vastly different
understandings of the permissible extent of force in self-defense
against such groups; defeating a terrorist group could mean the
existing group can no longer launch attacks or it could mean no
terrorist attacks or attempted attacks by any terrorists—an
extraordinarily broad conception of defeat.85 The elasticity of the
meaning of defeat in these types of conflicts, combined with the
state’s near monopoly of information regarding the nature of the
ongoing threat, suggests that a state could continually expand the
notion of defeat to include preventing recurrence of violence, even
after a conflict has seemingly ended. Doing so would mean that any
use of force to prevent such recurrence of violence would be
removed from the jus ad bellum and self-defense paradigm and
squeezed into the armed conflict paradigm by extending the outer
boundaries of that armed conflict with each recurrence of violence.
Each of these arguments offers a state possible legal
justifications to argue that it does not need to wait for a new
armed attack in order to trigger its right to use force in selfdefense. Each argument also presents a problematic broadening
of the parameters for a state’s use of force and thus must be
assessed with careful attention to ensure appropriate protection
of the goals of the jus ad bellum. Understanding how a state might
seek to justify the use of force to prevent recurrence of conflict,
including and in particular, arguments that stretch the law to
near or beyond the breaking point, is essential to preserving the
law’s fidelity and preventing interpretations that render the law
ineffective or irrelevant.
B.

Defining Armed Attack in the Aftermath of Conflict

As classical international law demands, an armed attack
therefore remains the essential trigger for the use of force in selfdefense even in preventing recurrence of conflict. It is then
critical to explore whether the definition of armed attack is the
same in the post-conflict scenario or, alternatively, whether a
state could finesse the definition and threshold as a way to more
easily trigger the right of self-defense. An armed attack is
generally understood to be more severe than a use of force, based
85 See Blank, supra note 17, at 293 (noting that “this broader conception of
defeat renders the necessity and proportionality criteria for lawful self-defence
effectively toothless without some more specific metrics to guide the analysis”).
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on the gravity or the “scale and effects”86 of the act, such that
“the notion of force is broader in scope than armed attack or
aggression and . . . various minor incidents that do not qualify
as aggression may nevertheless constitute a use of force.”87 When
a state seeks to prevent the resurgence of violence after conflict,
the nature and types of threats or acts it might encounter and
rely on to demonstrate the existence of an armed attack could
place new stresses on our understanding of the framework of use
of force and armed attack. If so, such pressures could present
long-term risks to the effective application of the jus ad bellum.
Several factors might offer states possible opportunities
to argue for altering the meaning of armed attack—primarily by
lowering the threshold in some way—so as to trigger the right to
use force in self-defense more easily, including the nature of the
individual or group engaging in the relevant act, the location of
the act or actors, and the nature and types of acts in question.
In addition, the concept of anticipatory self-defense may change
to some degree based on the nature of the conflict and the actors
involved, allowing for the use of force sooner or for less grave
acts than might be ordinarily expected or accepted in a situation
where a previous conflict did not color the parties’ intentions or
analyses or the perspectives of external actors and observers.
One overarching factor that might weigh more heavily on these
considerations is the timeframe of the possible resurgence in
violence, such that acts that take place long after the end of
conflict are less likely to be viewed differently than stand-alone
attacks or violence, whereas the immediate weeks or months
after the end of conflict may inherently add the intangible effects
of the recently-ended conflict to any analysis. The following
discussion will focus on the nontemporal factors, while noting
the effects of the timeframe where significant.
First, the nature of the actor whose violence or attacks the
state seeks to suppress with the use of force after conflict could
have a significant effect on the meaning of armed attack in such
circumstances. State practice in the aftermath of international
armed conflict suggests that the possibility of another state
restarting the violence does not alter the meaning of armed
attack, regardless of whether the conflict ended with a formal
peace treaty or an armistice or similar type of agreement. In this
way, the demands for order and predictability in the international
system reinforce the application of the generally accepted
86 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195 (June 27).
87 See Ruys, supra note 39, at 164.
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conception of armed attack when considering the interaction
between two states, even after those two states have already
fought one conflict. However, one area where the existence of a
prior armed conflict might enable a state to justify altering the
conception and attribution of an armed attack to a state is with
the use of proxy groups. A state that has recently fought a conflict
with another state may be quicker to attribute the acts of proxy
groups to that state, or to claim that state controls such proxy
groups, with respect to assigning responsibility to that state for
purposes of responding in self-defense.
Non-state armed groups offer a more complex picture, as
might be expected. Some non-state groups that seek to hold and
govern territory—i.e., have state-like aspirations, in effect—may
function like states in this analysis, because they have a range of
activities and opportunities for interaction with the state apart
from violence. Most such groups, however, are engaged in armed
conflicts inside the territory of the state, thus removing those
situations from the instant analysis because they do not implicate
the jus ad bellum. For extraterritorial or cross-border conflicts,
particularly when a state is fighting a terrorist group, the very
nature of such groups introduces the possibility that the state
might take a more expansive view of armed attack when it recently
fought a conflict against that very group. This lowering of the
threshold would seem to be a natural consequence of the non-state
group’s sole focus on violence against civilians as the means of
interaction with the state to achieve its goals—the essence of a
terrorist group.88 The state would have suffered an earlier armed
attack or faced an imminent armed attack by the terrorist group
and used force in self-defense, leading to an armed conflict to defeat
the group or otherwise end the attacks and threat of future attacks.
In the aftermath of that conflict, the state may be prepared or
motivated to interpret lower level acts as triggering the right to
self-defense so as to prevent an escalation and recurrence of
violence. In essence, because a terrorist group has only one type
and degree of engagement—spectacular attacks against civilians—
88 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 3–07.2, ANTITERRORISM vii (2010) (defining
terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce
governments or societies”); S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004) (defining terrorism as “criminal
acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public
or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”); N. Atl. Treaty Org.
[NATO] Glossary of Terms and Definitions, at 2-T-5, Apr. 3, 2013, NATO Doc. AAP-06 (defining
terrorism as “[t]he unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or
property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political,
religious or ideological objectives”).
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the fact that it is that same group from a prior conflict that is
engaging in certain acts involving violence or anticipated violence
could be significant in leading the state to have a quicker response
threshold and thus a less stringent definition of armed attack.
Moreover, the fact that the enemy in the previous conflict was a
terrorist group could lead to the question framed above of whether
an armed attack is needed at all for the state to use force to prevent
a resurgence of violence. One might seek to argue that a resurgence
of violence or recurrence of conflict is automatically expected with
a terrorist group, because as long as the group exists, it has only
one purpose—to engage in violence against civilians for political
ends. Thus, as long as the group exists, even if the conflict has
ended, the state would be justified in using force against that group
to prevent any resurgence of violence—a highly problematic
assertion but one that must be anticipated in order to fully
understand the ramifications of a state’s plan to maintain military
forces to prevent resurgence of conflict.
A second and equally consequential factor a state might
look to is the type of acts that meet the threshold for an armed
attack. Although there is considerable debate regarding the precise
threshold for armed attack, some general consensus exists that the
effects of the act in question and the severity of those effects are the
central consideration; that is, whether it causes harm to persons or
property through kinetic violence or other means with comparable
effects.89 Notwithstanding the seeming clarity of international
law’s framework of armed attack, use of force, or not a use of force,
“the space between war and peace is not an empty one—but a
landscape churning with political, economic, and security
competitions that require constant attention.”90 Indeed, both states
and commentators have paid increased attention in recent years to
“hybrid warfare,” the blending of multiple and varied means to
gain an advantage, destabilize an adversary, or accomplish other
strategic goals. “[A] state engaging in hybrid warfare foments
instability in another state’s domestic affairs, prioritizing nonkinetic military means such as cyber and influence operations in
concert with economic pressure, support for local opposition

89 As the ICJ held in the Nicaragua case, an armed attack is the gravest form
of a use of force. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at ¶ 191. A use of force can be identified or
analyzed based on the consequences or effects of the act in question. See Michael N.
Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: Thoughts
on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 914–16 (1999).
90 Nadia Schadlow, Peace and War: The Space Between, WAR ON THE ROCKS
(Aug. 18, 2014), https://warontherocks.com/2014/08/peace-and-war-the-space-between/
[https://perma.cc/L3DH-YQ6C].
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groups, disinformation, and criminal activity.”91 The acts
commonly employed in hybrid warfare or similar operations
ordinarily do not meet the threshold for an armed attack or
perhaps even a use of force, but have significant effects nonetheless
either on their own or by creating openings or vulnerabilities for
other operations. Thus, “[o]ne of the characteristic features of
hybrid warfare . . . is that it is designed to operate ‘under [an
adversary’s] reaction threshold.’”92
Viewing such acts through the lens of a recently ended
conflict may lead a state to different conclusions about the
severity, gravity, or consequence of such acts, producing a
different understanding of armed attack and thus lowering the
trigger for self-defense. Consider, for example, cyber acts
comparable to those perpetrated against Estonia in 2007, which
are generally accepted as not rising to the level of an armed
attack.93 If such acts were to occur in the aftermath of a conflict
between the same two parties, one could imagine that the target
of such cyber operations would view such acts through the lens
of the prior conflict and attach greater gravity to them, perhaps
asserting that they rise above the threshold of an armed attack.
Other below-the-threshold acts regularly employed in hybrid
warfare could also be viewed differently in the aftermath of
armed conflict, including “[c]riminal activity . . . [which] either
further destabilizes local government or abets the insurgent or
irregular warrior by providing resources . . . . [such as through]
smuggling, narcoterrorism, illicit transfers of advanced
munitions or weapons, or the exploitation of urban gang
networks.”94 Such acts do not meet the threshold for an armed
attack,95 but a state seeking to prevent the recurrence of conflict
with a fellow state might take a more generous view of armed
attack if its former adversary were to arm insurgents within its
territory or otherwise facilitate instability or violence.
Recognizing that impetus and considering the validity of such
arguments and how to counterargue is therefore essential.
Such below-the-threshold attacks could also find
purchase in the definition of armed attack in the context of the
Douglas Cantwell, Hybrid Warfare: Aggression and Coercion in the Gray Zone, AM.
SOC’Y. INT’L L INSIGHTS (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/
issue/14/hybrid-warfare-aggression-and-coercion-gray-zone [https://perma.cc/9NFL-6ZKW].
92 Aurel Sari, Legal Aspects of Hybrid Warfare, LAWFARE (Oct. 2, 2015),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-aspects-hybrid-warfare [https://perma.cc/R7EV-BBNY].
93 Nicholas Tsagourias, Cyber Attacks, Self-Defence and the Problem of
Attribution, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 229, 232 (2012).
94 Frank G. Hoffman, Hybrid Warfare and Challenges, 52 JOINT FORCE Q.34, 35 (2009).
95 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶195 (June 27).
91
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accumulation of events theory of armed attack. According to this
approach, “incidents that would in themselves merely constitute
‘less grave uses of force,’ can, when forming part of a chain of
events, qualitatively transform into an ‘armed attack’ triggering
the right of self-defence.”96 Note that the acts forming part of the
traditional accumulation of events are nonetheless uses of
force—raising the question of whether acts not rising to the level
of a use of force might, with added severity as perceived through
the lens of preventing recurrence of conflict, be seen as
contributing factors in such a chain of events. In effect, each act
receives a gravity or severity “boost” as a result of the state’s
focus on preventing the resurgence of violence after a conflict,
meaning that less grave acts will then meet the thresholds for
both use of force and armed attack. Alternatively, perhaps fewer
events would suffice to constitute an accumulation of events in
the aftermath of conflict, in the state’s view, in comparison to a
situation with no prior conflict or risk of resurgence of violence.
A third consideration that might affect the meaning or
threshold of armed attack in the aftermath of conflict is the location
of the potential armed attack, the use of force, and the object of that
force. For example, would the state seek to use force against a nonstate group in the same territory as the original conflict or in the
territory of another state, unrelated to the original conflict, where
it has relocated?97 Here, the most likely question is whether the
act’s location in the same area as the previous conflict adds to the
gravity of the harm in considering whether it is of sufficient scale
and effects to meet the test for an armed attack. Considerations of
gravity generally include whether there was harm to persons or
destruction of property, and the nature and extent of that harm,
such as how many persons were killed or injured, whether property
was destroyed, whether the property was critical national
infrastructure, and other similar factors.98 If the location of the
attack in the area of previous conflict adds to the gravity or scale
and effects of the attack, the necessary severity of these other

96 TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: EVOLUTIONS IN
CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 168 (2010); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 230–31.
97 ISIS and al Qaeda’s relocations or reemergence in other countries have all occurred
during the ongoing armed conflicts but nonetheless offer examples of this possibility after the
end of the conflict. Todd South, ISIS, al-Qaida ‘Regrouping’ in Libya, What’s US Strategy?
Congress Asks, MILITARYTIMES (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2018/04/23/isis-al-qaida-regrouping-in-libya-whats-us-strategy-congress-asks/
[https://perma.cc/U6VJ-L76R].
98 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 196; Eric Talbot Jensen, Computer Attacks
on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force Invoking the Right of Self-Defense, 38
STAN. J. INT’L L. 207, 221–29 (2002) (describing factors to determine whether a computer
network attack is a use of force that triggers a right to self-defense).
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traditional factors might decrease, thus changing the definition of
armed attack.
Finally, the desire to prevent the recurrence of conflict may
change perspectives on anticipatory self-defense because of a
different conception of imminence in the aftermath of conflict.
Where an armed attack is imminent but has not yet occurred, there
is general acceptance that a state may act in anticipatory selfdefense to prevent the attack from occurring—notwithstanding
significant disagreement about what specifically constitutes an
imminent attack and when the right of self-defense is triggered in
such situations.99 Anticipatory self-defense inherently relies in
significant part on how the state discerns the intention of the
apparent attacking state or non-state actor, to determine whether
an armed attack is indeed imminent. Both the nature of the
adversary actor and the manner in which the conflict ended could
thus nudge a state closer to the belief that the fact of a prior conflict
means that the adversary from that conflict automatically poses an
imminent threat of attack. If the conflict ended in a somewhat
uncertain manner or without a comprehensive commitment from
the other state, the post-conflict period could seem more like an
interlude rather than a path to peaceful relations and greater
stability. Similarly, the extraordinary uncertainty regarding the
end of conflict with transnational terrorist groups could cause a
state to view any action by such a group after the apparent end of
conflict as an imminent attack. The perspective of preventing
recurrence of conflict therefore places pressure on both the
meaning of imminence and the types of acts that could constitute
such an imminent armed attack.
All of these factors have the potential to place pressure
on the definition of and the threshold for armed attack, the
foundational element in determining the right to use force in
self-defense. If the threshold is lower or more acts fit within the
definition in the specific context of using force to prevent
recurrence of violence, this greater elasticity will not only enable
the use of force in self-defense more quickly in such situations,
but will also then likely translate into other situations of
potential self-defense. The consequence could be a dramatic
change in our understanding of armed attack and self-defense
and a lessening of constraints on the use of force, a highly
problematic result.

99

See LUBELL, supra note 23, at 54–56; HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 277.
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UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE AND PARAMETERS:
NECESSITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

Once an armed attack triggers the state’s right to use force
in self-defense, the use of force must comply with the
requirements of necessity and proportionality. Regardless of
whether the threshold for an armed attack changes in any way in
the context of a state seeking to prevent recurrence of violence, as
examined above, the necessity and proportionality requirements
remain essential to the analysis of any action in self-defense.
However, just as the post-conflict scenario may alter the
triggering components of self-defense, it also may produce varying
understandings and applications of necessity and proportionality.
To explore the application of necessity and proportionality
comprehensively, it is first essential to understand the state’s
goals when acting in self-defense. This section therefore first
examines the legitimate objectives when acting in self-defense
and then analyzes the particular challenges and considerations in
applying necessity and proportionality in the context of using
force in self-defense to prevent recurrence of conflict.
A.

Legitimate Objectives of Self-Defense

Overall, the requirements of necessity and proportionality
focus on whether the defensive act is appropriate in relation to
the ends sought when acting in self-defense. Any assessment of
self-defense must therefore start with the victim state’s aim or
objective in using force in response to the armed attack or
imminent armed attack. Necessity focuses on whether force is the
only means available to achieve that objective; proportionality
looks to the relationship between the force used and the objective
sought. How decision makers in the victim state “define the aims
of such [self-defense] force and assess the scope of the force and
the means necessary to achieve those aims”100 is therefore critical
to understanding any determination or analysis of the lawfulness
of the state’s action. A first question, before identifying specific
issues with respect to necessity and proportionality in using force
to prevent recurrence of conflict, is whether preventing the
recurrence of conflict is a legitimate aim of acting in self-defense
or, alternatively, how well it matches with other accepted aims of
self-defense.

100 David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionality in Jus
Ad Bellum, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 235, 267 (2013).
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The fundamental premise of self-defense is that a state is
not rendered helpless when faced with an attack, but rather can
respond to protect its territory, sovereignty, nationals, and
interests. The most basic and widely-supported aim of selfdefense therefore is to halt or repel an attack: “In the case of selfdefence against an armed attack that has already occurred, it is
the repulsing of the attack giving rise to the right that is the
criterion against which the response is measured.”101 If, for
example, one state attacks another, repelling the attack would
naturally include military operations not only to halt the
aggressor, but also to push it back across the border. However,
this limited concept of the legitimate aims of self-defense does not
comport with the realities of the international system and does
not provide sufficient protection for victim states if an aggressor
state faces no consequences beyond a repulsed attack, leading
states to highlight the need to prevent future attacks as well.102
These disconnects are only magnified in the case of terrorist
attacks, where there is generally no one for the state to repel at
the moment of attack, contributing to the reliance on preventing
future attacks as a justification for acting in self-defense.
Beyond these objectives, a state may also seek to defeat the
attacking entity completely, whether state or non-state group,
raising the question of whether the destruction of the attacking
force’s capability is a legitimate objective of force in self-defense.
Analyzing defeat as an objective of self-defense can arise in two
different ways. First, if halting or repelling an attack is a legitimate
objective, one can ask whether it is “proportionate to take action
that is designed to prevent such an attack occurring again and
restore the security of the State,”103 including the total defeat of the
attacking entity’s forces if necessary. Here, the question is how
elastic the degree of force to achieve the more conservative
objective of halting or repelling can actually be—that is, whether
the objective of halting or repelling an attack can include defeating
the adversary. Alternatively, the second possibility is to ask
whether the destruction of the attacking force’s capability itself is
a legitimate objective of force in self-defense. Current state
practice, in which the United States operates with the stated
objective of defeating or destroying al-Qaeda and ISIS in two
101 JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 156 (2004).
102 For example, President Clinton presented this argument in announcing U.S.
strikes in response to the Embassy bombings. See Clinton, supra note 82. Similarly, the
United States declared in October 2001, upon the launch of airstrikes in Afghanistan,
that it was using force against al Qaeda to “prevent and deter further attacks on the
United States.” See Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N., supra note 13.
103 See GARDAM, supra note 101, at 165.

32

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

concurrent counterterrorism conflicts, suggests at a minimum that
defeating or destroying an attacking entity is an acceptable aim of
using force in self-defense if such defeat or destruction is the means
by which the state can end or prevent attacks.104
The use of force to prevent recurrence of conflict introduces
significant questions regarding the legitimate aims of using force
in self-defense. The objectives discussed above progress from
narrow (repelling or halting a specific attack) to broader
(preventing future attacks) to the most expansive (defeat or
destruction of the attacker). Preventing recurrence of conflict
appears to correlate with the more permissive end of that
spectrum, fitting somewhere along the range from preventing
future attacks to defeat of the potential adversary, depending on
how one understands the overall strategic goals.
At a tactical level, the use of force in self-defense to prevent
the recurrence of conflict could mean one-off uses of force to halt or
prevent attacks by disgruntled individuals or reconstituted units of
the adversary, or periodic uses of detention for the same purposes.
Fitting such aims into the existing framework could be feasible,
depending on the specific factual circumstances. A look at the goals
the United States stated for remaining in Syria, however, suggests
a far broader set of goals for the planned continued military
presence in Syria. At a minimum, “U.S. military officials have
underscored the need to ensure against the emergence of power
vacuums in ISIS-liberated areas to prevent the extremist group’s
return.”105 But beyond that, a continued military presence in Syria
would seek to achieve a larger set of purposes: “ensuring ISIS
cannot re-emerge” and “that Syria never again serves as a platform
or safe haven for terrorists to organize, recruit, finance, train and
carry out attacks on American citizens at home or abroad or
against [its] allies.”106 At an even broader level, the United States
also seeks to “counter both the Assad regime and Iranian
104 See Blank, supra note 17, at 288, 295. For example, by 2015, the United Kingdom
had broadened its stated objective in using force against ISIS to the goal of degrading and
defeating ISIS. 602 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2015) col. 1489–90 (remarks by Prime Minister
David Cameron at House of Commons). In addition, Turkey launched Operation Sun against
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in 2008 to “destroy PKK camps and hunt rebels of the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).” Paul de Bendern, Turkey Launches Major Land Offensive into
Northern Iraq, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-iraqidUSANK00037420080222 [https://perma.cc/62R4-3AHH]. Turkey’s objective was generally
justified and accepted by the international community “as a broad response that would finally
weaken [the] PKK for good.” Christian. J. Tams & James G. Devaney, Applying Necessity and
Proportionality to Anti-Terrorist Self-Defense, 45 ISR. L. REV. 91, 103 (2012).
105 Mona Yacoubian, A New U.S. Strategy Will Keep American Troops in Syria,
U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/01/new-usstrategy-will-keep-american-troops-syria [https://perma.cc/6NSJ-W3NF].
106 See Tillerson, supra note 1.
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influence,”107 possibly by using U.S. military outposts in Syria to
“monitor[ ] the movement and repositioning of the jihadists, and
also interdict[ ] Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps plans to
establish a direct land corridor from Iraq to Syria.”108
The legitimacy of these stated, or presumed, objectives for
using force to prevent the recurrence of conflict depends on how
well they track the fundamental idea that force can be used in
self-defense to halt or repel attacks. The variety of objectives
described in the earlier part of this discussion all relate, in some
manner, to preventing or halting attacks—with significant debate
regarding which are appropriate and which stretch the notion of
self-defense too far. In contrast, the objectives in using force to
prevent recurrence of conflict are much more attenuated, as a
starting point, from the core self-defense purpose of repelling or
halting attacks. To the extent that such use of force seeks to
achieve objectives directly related to the adversary in the previous
conflict, a state might effectively present it as fitting within the
overall framework of self-defense and many of the considerations
examined above with respect to the need for and definition of
armed attack would apply. However, objectives that stretch
beyond the adversary in the previous conflict are harder to
shoehorn into a paradigm for the use of force in self-defense to
prevent recurrence of conflict. Those that can still be connected to
the adversary in the previous conflict in some manner—perhaps
because the object of the force would support or facilitate the
adversary’s resurgence—may be legitimate aims, although
meeting the requirements of necessity and proportionality would
be challenging, as discussed below. In contrast, objectives that
seek to prevent another party entirely from using the post-conflict
environment to its advantage will be much harder to justify on
self-defense grounds, absent an effective argument that necessity
and proportionality with respect to a more direct self-defense
claim can encompass such objectives. No less, these broader
objectives pose a significant challenge to the self-defense
framework overall, and risk eroding its central role as a
constraint on the use of force.
B.

Necessity

As a general rule, necessity focuses on whether there are
adequate non-forceful options to repel or halt an attack that
See Yacoubian, supra note 105.
Michael Weiss & Hassan, Here’s What the Trump Administration is Really Plotting
in Syria, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.thedailybeast.com/is-trump-serious-aboutsyria-do-we-stay-do-we-go-and-who-pays [https://perma.cc/K26A-ETKK].
107
108
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triggered the right of self-defense, including, as possible
examples, diplomatic measures, enhanced defensive posture, or
reparations. To this end, “acts done in self-defense must not
exceed in manner or aim the necessity provoking them.”109 The
Caroline formula of “no choice of means” guides the application of
necessity with an underlying goal of minimizing or prohibiting
the resort to force except in situations where it is unavoidable to
protect the state’s essential interests. If a state can “achieve the
same result by measures not involving the use of armed force, it
would have no justification for adopting conduct which
contravened the general prohibition against the use of armed
force.”110 Necessity thus serves as a critical gatekeeper enforcing
the overall prohibition on the use of force. Importantly, the
requirement of necessity rests on reasonableness, and therefore
“does not require victim states to exhaust all non-forcible
responses before resorting to self-defence, but only those
alternatives that are likely to be effective.”111 The necessity
analysis applies not only to action taken to halt and repel an
initial attack, but to all possible aims of self-defense, including
broader action to eliminate a continuing threat. Many of the
considerations that pose interesting questions regarding the
definition of armed attack, for example, will equally challenge the
application of the requirement of necessity. Thus, while it may
seem that preventing the recurrence of conflict is simply a matter
of preventing future attacks and accordingly lies squarely within
a traditional necessity analysis, the possible objectives of force to
prevent the recurrence of conflict suggest a range of complex
considerations for the necessity analysis.
In considering the viability of a state’s claim to self-defense
to prevent recurrence of conflict, the overarching issue with respect
to necessity is whether the existence of a prior conflict accelerates
or otherwise changes the necessity calculation. In other words, in
determining whether there are non-forceful means available to
prevent an attack—understood here as the recurrence of conflict—
a state might argue that the very fact of the prior conflict between
the same two parties means that force is obviously necessary. In
effect, if force was the result in the past, the state can assume that
non-forceful measures will not work on future occasions. Although
international law does not explicitly include a graduated concept of
necessity based on the history of the interactions between the
109 Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 113, 132 (1986).
110 Robert Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980]
2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 13, ¶ 120, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7.
111 See Tams & Devaney, supra note 104, at 96.
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relevant parties, the nature of necessity suggests that a past
conflict may well prove significant in any analysis. Any assessment
of necessity will be based on the expectations and understandings
of the potential adversary’s intentions and capabilities—it is not
unreasonable to presume that a prior conflict would affect that
assessment accordingly.112 Here, the manner in which the previous
conflict ended could be significant. A conflict with a more formal
ending, such as an international armed conflict that ends based on
a peace treaty or armistice, likely produces an environment in
which more non-forceful means to prevent a resurgence of violence
are available because of the framework in place for diplomatic
engagement, negotiations and solutions not involving force. At the
other end of the spectrum, after a conflict that ends with the state
comprehensively defeating a non-state group such that it disbands
and its fighters reintegrate into the population, the state may not
have information about or access to any leadership or other
organizational elements with whom to engage in any negotiations,
such that the only method the state has to communicate is force.
One particularly significant concern is that the nature of
the potential adversary in a renewed conflict and the breadth of
potentially-asserted objectives of self-defense in preventing the
recurrence of conflict could result in the necessity requirement
losing its force in the face of an ever-expanding justification for
the use of force in some manner. The necessity requirement is
fundamental to the effective operation of the law of self-defense
and the faithful adherence to the purposes of the U.N. Charter
in minimizing the resort to force—stretching it beyond
recognition erodes constraints on the use of force, allowing for
greater instability and harm to civilians and others caught in
the zone of combat. First, the nature of the potential adversary
or attacker can undermine the necessity requirement by making
it too easy—or even automatic—to satisfy. As suggested above,
a state that has emerged from a conflict with a terrorist group
and believes that at least some of the group’s operatives remain
alive and retain their radical ideology can effectively argue that
the group’s existence is sufficient evidence of imminent attacks,
because a terrorist group’s entire modus operandi is to engage
in attacks against civilians, and therefore force is the only means
by which to prevent those attacks because terrorist groups by
their nature do not respond productively to non-forceful

112 See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 230 (highlighting the role of
reasonableness in the necessity inquiry).
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measures.113 Although the role of the territorial state in
exercising its authority to stop attacks by the non-state group on
its territory is critical to any assessment of necessity,114 the fact
of the previous conflict may enable the state claiming selfdefense to dismiss any reliance on the territorial state due to its
failure or inability in the past. These arguments could be wellsubstantiated in a particular circumstance; however, the overall
effect of a rule accepting that the very existence of some
members of a terrorist group after a conflict justifies the use of
force to prevent a recurrence of that conflict is highly
problematic given the fundamental goals of the jus ad bellum.
The goals the United States had stated for the future of
its operations in Syria introduce other questions as well,
including whether the use of force in self-defense to prevent the
recurrence of conflict applies only to the state or other group that
was the adversary in the prior conflict or whether it can also be
addressed to other groups that might take advantage of the postconflict chaos, groups that form from operatives remaining from
the group defeated in the previous conflict, proxy groups in the
aftermath of a conflict with another state, or any others. In
essence, does necessity encompass force to prevent any new
conflict or only a recurring conflict? And, if the latter, does a
recurring conflict mean only the same state or group as the
previous conflict or would it also include conflict with a proxy
group, reconstituted non-state armed group or other group with
some type of links to the original state or group? The potential
for nearly infinite expansion and elasticity in the parameters of
self-defense is troubling indeed. In the classical conception, the
necessity requirement serves to balance the exigency of
responding to an armed attack—or imminent armed attack—
against the foundational prohibition against the use of force as
a means to ensure stability and minimize violence. A broad view
of what preventing the recurrence of conflict entails—either
with regard to the breadth of actors involved or the imminence
or likelihood of conflict recurring—will ultimately render
necessity a requirement in name only, substantially loosening
the constraints on the use of force. Preserving the normative
113 AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, WHEN SHOULD WE TALK TO
TERRORISTS? 3 (2010), https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR240Cronin_3a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/579F-XZKX] (noting, in examining options for negotiating with terrorist groups, that
“negotiations between states and terrorist groups are historically rare: the vast majority of
terrorist groups do not negotiate at all”).
114 See LUBELL, supra note 23, at 46 (explaining that attempts at non-forceful
measures with the non-state attacker are not sufficient for necessity; the victim state
must also request or demand that the territorial state “exercise its jurisdiction and take
measures to prevent the hostile activities by the non-state actor”).
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force of self-defense, and the necessity requirement in
particular, therefore demands that necessity be applied
stringently to any claims of the use of force in self-defense to
prevent the recurrence of conflict.
C.

Proportionality

The criterion of proportionality operates to limit the
amount, nature, and degree of force used to only that force
needed to achieve the objective of acting in self-defense. The
requirement of proportionality measures the extent of the use of
force against the overall military goals, such as fending off an
attack or subordinating the enemy. Proportionality does not
address whether force may be used at all—the main focus of the
necessity criterion—but looks at how much force may be used,
with an eye to “minimi[zing] . . . the disruption of international
peace and security.”115 Scholars have historically presented
various methods or formulas for understanding proportionality,
including the idea that the force used must be “what is required
for achieving [the] object,”116 that the response must be
proportionate to the danger posed,117 or that the defensive action
“is proportionate, in nature and degree, to the prior illegality or
the imminent attack.”118 Ultimately, proportionality requires not
some measure of symmetry between the original attack and the
use of force in response, but that the measure of counterforce
used is proportionate to the needs and goals of repelling or
defeating the original attack.119 As a report to the International
Law Commission explains,
It would be mistaken . . . to think that there must be proportionality
between the conduct constituting the armed attack and the opposing
conduct. The action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well
have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those of the attack
suffered. What matters in this respect is the result to be achieved by

115 See GARDAM, supra note 101, at 16; see also Christopher Greenwood, Self-Defence
and the Conduct of International Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF
PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE, 273, 278 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989).
116 Humphrey Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States
in International Law, 81 RECEUIL DES COURS [COLLECTED COURSES HAGUE ACAD. INT’L L.]
455, 464 (1952).
117 D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (1958).
118 ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 201 (1963).
119 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 275; Michael N. Schmitt, “Change Direction”
2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 127, 154 (2008).

38

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:1

the “defensive” action, and not the forms, substance and strength of
the action itself.120

The idea of using force in self-defense to prevent the
recurrence of conflict poses two particular sets of challenges for
the proportionality requirement. The first is, in essence,
existential: if preventing a recurrence of conflict is a legitimate
aim of self-defense, then one could argue that nearly any amount
of force is proportionate to that goal. An armed conflict is
significantly more extensive and consequential than a single
attack—indeed, preventing conflicts is one of the central purposes
of both the U.N. Charter and the modern framework of
international law—thus creating a nearly open-ended space for
the proportionate use of force.121 Consider the difficulties of
arguing that any particular use of force in such a situation is
disproportionate given the lack of identifiable parameters and the
ability of the state using force to present the grave danger of a
renewed armed conflict as the risk it seeks to prevent. Any use of
force could be argued to be justifiable as proportionate if the
alternative—not acting or using less force—would mean a fullblown conflict. If, as recent state practice appears to demonstrate,
the aim of preventing attacks can include defeating or destroying
the attacking state or group entirely, then extending that theory
to include preventing a renewed conflict is not unlikely.
Apart from that first existential question, applying
proportionality to the use of force to prevent recurrence of
conflict poses operational challenges as well. Preventing a
recurrence of conflict in a post-conflict environment, before any
actual resurgence of violence occurs, offers few metrics or
indicators to identify how much force is needed and whether it
is successful because it is also possible that there would have
been no violence or recurrence of conflict without the use of force.
If the state has intelligence regarding attacks being planned or
some attacks that have occurred, then the use of force would fit
within the traditional notion of self-defense to end an attack and
prevent future attacks, matching the current modus operandi in
this area and offering a model for understanding proportionate
force. Where the state seeks to occupy the potential space—both
physical and figurative—for the previous adversary or other
actors to nurture and engage in violence, the use of force in selfdefense is operating one or more steps in advance of the usual
conceptual framework. If the state is successful, no plans or
See Ago, supra note 110, ¶ 121.
See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 237–38 (describing the difficulty of
calculating an appropriate defensive armed reprisal).
120
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other suggestions of attacks or violence would emerge, leaving
no way to consider how much force is acceptable and how much
goes too far.
The use of force to prevent recurrence of conflict with nonstate actors also introduces the question of against whom such
force can be used. If the United States were to maintain a military
presence in Syria after the end of the conflict with ISIS, on the
basis of self-defense to prevent a recurrence of conflict, the first
question is whether the use of force in the form of uninvited
military presence in the territory of Syria is proportionate to the
objective of preventing a recurrence of conflict with ISIS. Unlike
other situations in which a state uses force against a non-state
actor, even in the territory of a state, here the use of force is
against only the territorial state by dint of presence without
consent, and the state has no option for arguing that the use of
force is only against the non-state actor, because the non-state
actor does not have sovereignty or territorial independence that
the mere presence of military forces can violate. In this scenario,
the location of the military forces would be relevant to the
proportionality analysis—if the United States limits its military
presence to areas where ISIS operatives remain or are most likely
to reconstitute, it could at least make a better proportionality
argument than if it expands its military presence to other areas
within Syria, thus extending beyond areas directly related to the
previous conflict and beyond the potential recurrence of conflict.
If the military presence in the areas frequented by ISIS were
accepted as a proportionate use of force, any geographic expansion
would require additional information demonstrating that such
new locations were necessary for achieving the objective of
preventing the recurrence of conflict.
Geographical expansion beyond the territorial state where
the risk of conflict resides stresses the proportionality requirement
yet further. Consider two possibilities: one regarding a potential
conflict with another state and the other a conflict with a non-state
actor. First, imagine a state seeking to prevent recurrence of
conflict with another state positions its military, without consent,
in the territory of the state geographically in between itself and the
former adversary state, to prevent that state from using its
neighbor to stage attacks. Although this example appears to
harken back to the days of maneuver warfare, such conflicts
remain possible and the example offers a useful lens for analysis.
It is difficult to imagine that the international community would
consider this use of force in the territory of a neighboring state to
be proportionate without solid information that the neighboring
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state was playing a role in the threatened resumption of conflict.
As a second example, a state seeking to prevent recurrence of
conflict with a non-state armed group in another state positions its
military in the territory of a third state to prevent the non-state
armed group from seeking a foothold in that third country to
restart its violent efforts. Here, although the example involves the
same use of force in the territory of a third state, state practice
regarding the use of force against non-state actors suggests that
the proportionality rule might be somewhat more flexible, whether
due to the notion of unwilling or unable,122 or other considerations.
In either case, however, asserting that the use of force in a third
state to prevent conflict with another state or a non-state group is
proportionate to that objective, opens the door to significant erosion
of the proportionality requirement.
Finally, the nature of the acts involved in the use of force
to prevent recurrence of conflict demand greater scrutiny and
are likely to have a greater effect on the proportionality analysis
than in more classical examples of using kinetic force to deter or
prevent attacks. Traditional jus ad bellum proportionality
discussions generally center on how much kinetic force is used
and for how long—because halting an attack or preventing
future attacks involves fighting back against attacks and
destroying the attacker’s capabilities. Here, in contrast, the
proportionality assessment would likely narrow to much more
detailed issues of gradation, such as whether military presence
alone is proportionate, whether patrols as a show of force
without any direct engagements are proportionate, and so on
through seemingly tiny steps along a continuum below any
kinetic force. It is not clear that the jus ad bellum proportionality
criterion is designed for such a step-by-step analytical demand,
which could result in states losing confidence in the effectiveness
of the legal principles because they simply no longer make
operational sense. These operational challenges, along with the
broader conceptual considerations above, present significant
concerns about the short- and long-term consequences for the
international law of self-defense resulting from an assertion of
the right to use force to prevent recurrence of conflict.
122 “Unwilling or unable” refers to the idea that a state seeking to use force in selfdefense against a non-state armed group in the territory of another state must assess
whether the territorial state is “unable or unwilling” to suppress the threat from that nonstate armed group itself. See Deeks, supra note 24, at 499. It is also often understood to
justify a state’s use of force in self-defense against such an armed group precisely because
of the territorial state’s inability or unwillingness. In the instant discussion, such inability
or unwillingness could provide greater elasticity to the proportionality assessment by
supporting a more robust use of force by the state.
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Understanding how a state might present arguments about the
application of the law and how those arguments could alter
accepted applications and interpretations of the law is therefore
essential to protecting the law against inappropriate expansion
and preserving the law’s overarching objectives.

